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On Search and Seizure
1. INTRODUCTION
Last summer, in Stone v. Powell and Wolff v. Rice,' the
United States Supreme Court held that habeas corpus relief is no
longer available to state prisoners who allege that their convictions
were based upon illegally-seized evidence. The major effect of
that ruling was to make state law controlling on questions of search
and seizure. 2
It is clear from Powell and Rice that the Supreme Court no
longer will require states to adhere to "federal standards" 3 on
fourth amendment questions.4 In both cases, state courts had
found valid searches 5 and lower federal courts had held those same
searches invalid.6 The Supreme Court's opinion had the effect of
reinstating the state decisions.
1. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The two cases were decided together. For com-
mentary on the cases, see 37 LA. L. REv. 289 (1976); KAmISAR, LAFAVE,
& ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 33, 67, 130, 170 (Supp. 1977).
2. In sum, we conclude that where the State has provided an op-
portunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas cor-
pus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an uncon-
stitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.
428 U.S. at 494.
Since an exhaustion of state remedies has traditionally been re-
quired before a petition for habeas could be brought, it is hard to see
how any state prisoner will be able to qualify for habeas relief on
a fourth amendment question. No other form of relief is available
to get a federal order releasing one from state imprisonment.
3. That is, standards set by federal courts.
4. Constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
derives from the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be searched.
See notes 11-17 and accompanying text infra.
5. 428 U.S. at 471; State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972).
6. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (1974); Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280
(1975).
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Because, at least in the immediate future,7 state law can be
expected to control the search and seizure area, now is an appro-
priate time to discover how the courts of Nebraska interpret fourth
amendment rights and the rules8 instituted to enforce them. This
comment will discuss those interpretations and rules, largely
through an examination of Nebraska Supreme Court decisions of
the last ten years.
In the search and seizure area, boundaries are hard to find.
One can list many things the police may do-very few that they may
not. In the last decade, the Nebraska Supreme Court has listened
to fourth amendment arguments in approximately fifty cases. Of
those, it reversed a conviction on fourth amendment grounds only
in two-a 1975 case where blood was drawn for an alcohol test
while the subject was unconscious and had not been placed under
arrest, 9 and a 1976 case in which police forcibly entered a locked
camper without a warrant, or probable cause to suspect a crime
had been committed, or incriminating evidence in "plain view."'1
II. THE FEDERAL UNDERPINNINGS
Although state courts now may be free to fill in the details, the
basic framework of the constitutional protection from unreasonable
searches and/or seizures must be found in decisions of the United
7. If state decisions begin to diverge too greatly or state reviews of fourth
amendment questions become too cursory, the court might reverse
itself. Of course the makeup of the court itself could change also.
8. The main rule with which this comment is concerned is the so-called
exclusionary rule which prevents illegally seized evidence from being
admitted at a trial. See notes 14-17 infra; note 210 and accompanying
text infra.
9. State v. Howard, 193 Neb. 45, 225 N.W.2d 391 (1975).
10. State v. Aden, 196 Neb. 149, 241 N.W.2d 669 (1976).
Since this comment was prepared, the court reversed a conviction
in a third case, State v. Colgrove, 198 Neb. 319, 253 N.W.2d at 20
(1977). By a 4-3 vote, the court held invalid a search of an automo-
bile and its occupants made by a police officer who allegedly smelled
"a slight odor of burned marijuana" on Colgrove's breath. Id. at 323,
253 N.W.2d at 22. The officer and a companion, searching for two
women, had stopped the car, occupied only by Colgrove and two other
men. "[The police officer] acknowledged at trial that his only pur-
pose in stopping the car was to serve warrants on the Arapahoe
sisters and that when he got out of his own car he knew that they
were not in the Colgrove vehicle." Id. at 322, 253 N.W.2d at 22.
It is difficult, at this point, to assess the significance of Colgrove.
The case was argued twice--once before the appointment of Justice
C. Thomas White and once after. The new justice voted with the
majority and joined in Justice McCown's slightly stronger concurring
opinion. The case, viewed in conjunction with Howard and Aden,
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States Supreme Court." The landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio,12 is
of particular importance. It reiterated the fact that the fourth
amendment applied to the states, and expanded the protection
provided by that amendment to include the "exclusionary rule."
The "exclusionary rule" is a constitutionally-based rule of evi-
dence 13 that makes the fruit of an illegal search and/or seizure
inadmissible in court. At the time of Mapp, such evidence had
been excluded from federal courts for nearly fifty years.14 Some
twelve years earlier, the Court had refused to apply that rule to the
states,15 holding that "in a prosecution in a State court for a State
crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure."'16
Mapp was as unequivocal an overruling of a previous decision as
one could ask for. There, the court said:
Today we once again examine Wolf's constitutional documentation
of the right to privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and,
after its dozens of years on our books, are led by it to close the
only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all per-
sons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful con-
duct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmis-
sible in a state court.17
Attempts to apply that rule in specific cases inevitably lead to
the metaphysical argument of how much federal "baggage"' s was
foisted upon the states along with the constitutional principle enun-
ciated in Mapp. In other words, is there a "pure" or "basic" right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures that exists apart
from the body of federal case law that has interpreted that right in
may also indicate growing sensitivity on the supreme court's part-or
dwindling caution on the part of some police officers and lower court
judges.
11. This assumption is based upon U.S. CoNsT. art. 6, cl. 2, the so-called
"supremacy clause," and cases dating back to Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137 (1803), which interpreted that clause.
12. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
13. The Mapp opinion terms the exclusionary rule a "command which this
Court has held to be a clear, specific, and constitutionally required-
even if, judicially implied-deterrent safeguard without insistence
upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to 'a
form of words.'" Id. at 684.
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
15. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
16. Id. at 33, quoted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 645-46.
17. 367 U.S. at 654-55.
18. This metaphor appears in Justice Fortas' concurring opinion in Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 211 (1968).
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federal courts? Powell and Rice suggested an affirmative an-
swer and, perhaps, a promise that as long as state courts respect
that "pure" or "basic" right, the federal courts will not push their
baggage through the state courts' doors.
However, the problem of defining that "basic" right is compli-
cated by the fact that federal fourth amendment law, especially that
dealing with the exclusionary rule, is in flux. The broad outlines
of fourth amendment protection, drawn by the Warren Court and
generally followed in Nebraska,19 are becoming blurred. Powell
and Rice questioned federal supremacy in the fourth amendment
area.20  Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in those cases,
like his dissents in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,21 and Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 22 challenged the very validity of the
exclusionary rule. A case decided the same day as Powell and
Rice may indicate a return to the "silver platter" doctrine.
23
19. Nebraska law, as outlined in this comment, generally follows at least
the language of the United States Supreme Court's decisions. Two
major departures are that, in Nebraska, the defects in an affidavit for
a search warrant may be cured by subsequent police testimony at a
suppression hearing, and the Nebraska courts are more restrictive on
the question of standing. In addition, Nebraska is somewhat less per-
missive regarding blood tests in drunk driving cases. These depar-
tures will be discussed in more detail later.
For a somewhat dispairing view of the state of the federal law,
see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349 (1974).
20. See note 225 and accompanying text infra. See also note 11 supra.
21. 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971).
22. 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971).
23. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), held that evidence ille-
gally seized by Los Angeles police could be used by the Internal Reve-
nue Service in a suit to collect wagering excise taxes. The Court dis-
tinguished earlier cases, noting that two separate sovereignties were
involved and that the Internal Revenue Service prosecution was civil
in nature. The one case clearly on point, Suarez v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 792 (1972), which had not been appealed to the Supreme Court,
was overruled.
Thus, at least in a proceeding denominated "civil," evidence uncon-
stitutionally seized by a state officer was admitted in a federal pro-
ceeding. This revived the "silver platter" doctrine, earlier discredited
in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). As the court noted
in a helpful footnote, it was Justice Frankfurter in Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949), who gave the doctrine its name.
428 U.S. at 444 n.13.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart termed the civil-criminal
distinction of the Janis majority "irrelevant" in an area where civil
and criminal proceedings are commingled. He said:
To be sure, the Elkins case was a federal criminal proceeding
and the present case is civil in nature. But, our prior deci-
sions make it clear that this difference is irrelevant for Fourth
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III. THE NEBRASKA VIEW
The Nebraska Supreme Court has accepted the premise that
both the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule apply in the
state.24 From time to time, also, it has looked to federal case law
to interpret both the amendment itself and the extent of the exclu-
sionary rule.2 5 However, cases in this area tend to be very fact-
oriented and, on the whole, the Nebraska court-like all state courts
-has been left to its own devices in trying to guess how a particular
rule applies in a particular situation. Occasionally, a guess has
been wrong enough to merit federal reversal. More often, the
federal courts have either not been asked to review the issue or they
have refused. In one case that must have pleased Nebraska's
justices, the Eighth Circuit termed the state's rule "anamolous" but
the Nebraska Supreme Court, in a later case, adopted the same rule
as its own.26
Any case dealing with the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants presents difficult and very fundamental questions to a
court. Nowhere are two essential values of a democracy in such
open and insoluble conflict. Over and over again, courts are faced
with the problem of how to deal with a probably guilty person
whose guilt was established by illegal means. They must decide
whether it is more important to keep dangerous persons off the
streets or to preserve the integrity of constitutional rights.27  On
Amendment exclusionary rule purposes where, as here, the
civil proceeding serves as an adjunct to the enforcement of
the criminal law.
428 U.S. at 463 (dissenting opinion).
24. This acceptance has not always been with good grace. See, e.g., notes
217-24 and accompanying text infra. Some other states, notably Cal-
ifornia and Ohio, have begun to ignore Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Constitution and turn to the language of their
state constitutions to provide a greater degree of protection to criminal
defendants. See KAMISAR, LAFAvE, & ISRAEL, supra note 1, at 1-4.
25. The United States Supreme Court cases most frequently cited are
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1976); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573
(1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (often cited in dissenting opin-
ions); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). It is striking, however, how rarely the
Nebraska court turns to federal case law in its constitutional decisions.
26. State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 173 N.W.2d 372 (1970).
27. There are those who say, as did Justice (then Judge) Cardozo,
that under our constitutional exclusionary doctrine "(t)he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."
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the whole, the Nebraska court seems to see the obvious danger
posed by the presence of criminal defendants on the streets as more
threatening than the somewhat, subtler danger of eroding constitu-
tional rights.28 On close questions, federal courts have tended to
go the other way-which is why prisoners attempt collateral attacks
on their convictions 29 and why the Powell and Rice decisions have
changed the rules for Nebraska criminal defendants and prison-
ers.30
IV. THE LAW IN NEBRASKA
Before discussing the Nebraska rules, it will be useful to review
the procedure governed by those rules and to note where constitu-
tional questions may arise. Much of that procedure is governed by
sections 29-812 to 817 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes.
31
Typically, a police officer, acting on a tip or his own observa-
tion, seeks a court warrant authorizing him to make a search. In
order to get that warrant, he prepares an affidavit setting out the
facts that justify his request. Armed with that warrant, he
searches the premises described, seeking the evidence described. In
the course of that search, he also may seize contraband, or evidence
not described by the warrant, but in plain view.
Even when that typical32 pattern is followed, problems arise.
In some cases this will undoubtedly be the result. But, as
was said in Elkins, "there is another consideration-the im-
perative of judicial integrity." The criminal goes free, if he
must, but it is the law which sets him free. Nothing can de-
stroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe
its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own
existence.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 659 (citations omitted).
28. There is also an acute awareness of this balance in the Powell and
Rice decisions, both the majority's and the dissent's.
29. The choice, of course, is not entirely philosophical. Of necessity, the
prisoner will run out of state judicial remedies before turning to the
federal courts.
30. The Powell and Rice majority speaks of a full and fair litigation in
state court but does not seem concerned with more than procedural
fullness and fairness.
Because of its requirement of state action, the exclusionary rule-
and, indeed, the fourth amendment itself-is generally applied only
in criminal cases. A similar rule of law keeps illegal wiretap evidence
out of all trials.
31. NEB. RaV. STAT. §§ 29-812 to 817 (Reissue 1975).
32. "Classical" might be a better term. The author has no knowledge of
whether police officers habitually seek warrants before making
searches.
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The affidavit might not be sufficient to justify the warrant. The
search might exceed the authorization of the warrant. There
might be disagreements about the meaning of "contraband" or "in
plain view."
Of course, not all searches are made pursuant to search war-
rants.33 There are searches incident to arrests, searches made
when exigent circumstances make it impossible to get a warrant,
searches made on the basis of a police officer's reasonable suspi-
cions, and searches that start out not to be searches at all. Any of
those searches may or may not be legal.
Once the search is over and the evidence seized, the ball shifts
to the defendant. Before his trial, he can move to suppress the
evidence-that is, ask for a court order keeping it out of his trial, on
the ground that it was illegally seized. That is the first time the
exclusionary rule comes into play.3 4
In Nebraska, a refusal to suppress may not be appealed, but the
issue may be raised again at trial and, if the defendant is convicted,
on appeal. If the motion to suppress is granted, the state may
appeal.35
On an appeal to the state supreme court, it is not enough to
show that illegally-obtained evidence was admitted at trial; it must
also be shown that one would not have been convicted without that
evidence.3 6 Previously, an appeal to the state supreme court and a
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court were
required before a petition for writ of habeas corpus could be
brought.37 Such a petition, also referred to as a collateral attack,
would argue that the prisoner was illegally imprisoned because he
had been convicted on the basis of illegally-obtained evidence and
he should, therefore, be freed.38  That is the avenue that has been
explicitly closed by the Powell and Rice decisions.
33. For statutory authority of warrantless searches, see NEB. REV. STAT. §
29-817 (Reissue 1975).
34. In a sense, the issuing judge can suppress evidence by refusing to issue
a warrant.
35. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-824 (Reissue 1975).
36. See notes 217-27 and accompanying text infra.
37. Rules for exhaustion of remedies have been eased since Henry Hawk
was forced to spend 18 years in litigation before he could convince
a federal district court that he had exhausted his state remedies. He
apparently exhausted more than his state remedies because he died
months after a writ of habeas corpus was finally granted. The order
was vacated by the Eighth Circuit because Hawk's death made the
issue moot. The writ was granted in Hawk v. Hann, 103 F. Supp. 138
(D. Neb. 1952), vacated, Hann v. Hawk, 205 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1953).
38. The authority is 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970). However, the granting of
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A. Search Warrants
Nebraska's statutory law on search warrants is set out in sec-
tions 29-812 to 817 of the state's revised statutes. 9 The statutes
are very specific on some points, such as the fee to be paid to the
issuing court,40 but uninformative on others, particularly the
grounds upon which a warrant may be issued.
Warrants "may be issued" to search for and seize property
which has been:
(1) stolen, embezzled, or obtained under false pretenses in viola-
tion of the laws of the State of Nebraska, (2) designed or intended
for use or which is or has been used as the means of committing
a criminal offense, or (3) possessed, controlled, designed or in-
tended for use or which is or has been possessed, controlled, de-
signed, or used in violation of any law of the State of Nebraska
making such possession, control, design, or use or intent to use, a
criminal offense .... [or] property which constitutes evidence that
a criminal offense has been committed or that a particular person
has committed a criminal offense.41
The next section provides that:
A warrant shall issue only on affidavit sworn to before the judge
or magistrate and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant.
If the judge or magistrate is satisfied that grounds for the applica-
tion exist or that there is reasonable cause to believe that they exist,
he shall issue a warrant identifying the property to be seized and
naming or describing the person or place to be searched.42
Presumably, the phrase "grounds for the application" refers to
the previous section and means that the property that is the object
of the proposed search and seizure fits one of the categories
enumerated in section 29-813. 4 3
1. The Sufficiency of the Affidavit
Many cases focus on the issue of whether the person seeking
the warrant, usually a police officer, provided enough information
in his affidavit to justify issuance of the search warrant. In a
sense, they review the magistrate's or judge's decision.
habeas does not automatically mean freedom-the court may order a
new trial. However, if the illegal evidence was actually necessary to
the conviction, a new trial would be tantamount to release.
39. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-812 to 817 (Reissue 1975).
40. Id. § 29-812.
41. Id. § 29-813.
42. Id. § 29-814.
43. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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Problems tend to arise when a warrant is based upon informa-
tion supplied to the police by an informer. The Nebraska Su-
preme Court at one point adopted a fairly stringent test, essentially
that of Aguilar v. Texas,44 in which the United States Supreme
Court first held explicitly that states would be subject to the same
standard of reasonableness used to test the validity of federal
search warrants. Among other things, Aguilar required that an
affidavit set out facts to allow the magistrate to judge the reliability
of the informant, and not give a mere conclusory statement that the
informant is reliable. 45 Search warrants may be based upon hear-
say, according to Aguilar, so long as the magistrate is given reason
to believe the hearsay is reliable. 46
In a 1971 Nebraska case, State v. Holloway,47 Justice McCown
defined the test:
In passing on the validity of a search warrant the court may con-
sider only information brought to the attention of the magistrate.
For the affidavit of a tip from the informant to be sufficient the
magistrate must be informed of (1) some of the underlying circum-
stances from which the informant concluded that the articles were
located where he claimed they were, and (2) some of the underly-
ing circumstances from which the officer concluded that the in-
formant was credible.48
Holloway found the affidavit insufficient because it "alleged
that the sole and only reasons for his belief that the guns were
concealed or kept on the described premises was 'information re-
ceived from an informant whose information has been reliable in
the past.' 49 This was so much like the Aguilar affidavit,50 that it
would seem all but inevitable that it would be found inadequate.
However, the decision did not even mention Aguilar. It cited as
authority for the test quoted above two previous Nebraska cases in
which warrants had been upheld.5 1
44. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Before Aguilar, the fourth amendment did apply
to the states but federal standards for warrants and affidavits did not.
See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
45. 378 U.S. at 113.
46. Id. at 114.
47. 187 Neb. 1, 187 N.W.2d 85 (1971).
48. Id. at 4-5, 187 N.W.2d at 89.
49. Id. at 2-3, 187 N.W.2d at 88.
50. That affidavit read:
Affiants have received reliable information from a credible
person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and
other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at
the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use
contrary to the provisions of law.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 109.
51. State v. LeDent, 185 Neb. 380, 176 N.W.2d 21 (1970); State v. Waits,
185 Neb. 780, 178 N.W.2d 774 (1970).
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In the Holloway opinion, the court also held that Holloway
lacked standing 52 to raise the fourth amendment issue and that
consent had been given for the search.53 Consequently, Justice
White, in a concurring opinion, dismissed McCown's opinion on
the validity of the search warrant as "pure dictum." 54 "As such,"
he noted, "it is not binding on the court, in my opinion, and can
only serve to becloud similar issues in future cases."55
One could speculate that the court adopted McCown's relative-
ly stringent test because it did seem at the time to be "pure
dictum." It still seemed like pure dictum when the federal district
court reviewed the validity of the search on Holloway's petition for
habeas corpus. 56 That court agreed with McCown on the standing
issue and did not see any need to review his opinion on the validity
of the search warrant. However, Holloway was a tenacious soul
and the case went to the Eighth Circuit where "pure dictum"
suddenly became the "holding" of the case.5 7
The Eighth Circuit found that Holloway did, indeed, have
standing to raise the fourth amendment issue, even though the
apartment searched was that of a friend.58 The court also found
that the friend did not consent to the search until it was all over.5 9
The court affirmed the "holding" that the Holloway warrant did
not conform to the standard established in Aguilar.
The Eighth Circuit apparently was too sanguine. The first
sentence of McCown's "holding"60 lasted barely a year before the
Nebraska court, in State v. Rice6l held that information could be
offered at a suppression hearing6 2 that had not been included in the
affidavit accompanying the warrant application as long as that
information was discovered before an arrest was made.
52. See notes 177-98 and accompanying text infra.
53. See notes 125-42 and accompanying text infra.
54. 187 Neb. at 8-9; 187 N.W.2d at 91.
55. Id.
56. Holloway v. Wolff, 351 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Neb. 1972).
57. Holloway v. Wolff, 482 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1973).
58. "The Supreme Court has recently reiterated its position that the
'[p]resence of the defendant at the search and seizure was held in
Jones, to be a sufficient source of standing in itself.'" Id. at 112 (em-
phasis added by the Eighth Circuit) (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 113-15.
60. In passing on the validity of a search warrant the court may consider
only information brought to the attention of the magistrate. See note
48 supra.
61. 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972).
62. A suppression hearing is a hearing on a pre-trial motion asking the
court to rule that certain evidence is inadmissible. Its civil equivalent
is a motion in limine.
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While Rice was wending its way through the federal courts,
that portion of its decision was appearing in other Nebraska cases.
By 1975, Nebraska's federal district court and the Eighth Circuit
both had held in their Rice decisions that federal constitutional
standards only allow examination of information that was made
available to the issuing magistrate.613 Meanwhile, the Nebraska
court, citing its Rice decision as authority, was allowing deficient
affidavits to be cured at suppression hearings.6 4
Arguably, the law in Nebraska today is that defective affidavits
may be "cured" by supplying additional information at a suppres-
sion hearing as long as that information was acquired before the
search was made. Because the Nebraska court ignored the lower
federal courts' Rice decisions before the United States Supreme
Court spoke, it is unlikely that it will heed them now.
As far as the affidavit itself is concerned, the Nebraska court
apparently still requires information corroborating that given by
the informer and some factual basis for the police officer's conclu-
sion that the informer is reliable. It is unclear whether that is still
the federal test as well. A 1969 case, Spinelli v. United States,6 5
seemed to require either a' detailed tip or corroborating police
information as well as some of the underlying circumstances that
led the police to believe that the informant was reliable. In that
case, however, the affidavit was found deficient because there was
nothing in it to support the affiant's characterization of the tipper
as "reliable" and the recounting of the tip itself lacked any underly-
ing circumstances that would lead one to the informer's conclusion.
In Nebraska, there were several cases where police received
very detailed tips-what clothing a person would wear, what air-
plane flight the person would take, and what luggage the person
would carry. In one such case,66 the police arrested the person
described and seized his luggage. Then, they made out their
affidavit, got their warrant, and searched the previously seized
luggage. Although the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that the
standards for search and arrest are essentially the same 7-and
those for search and seizure are certainly the same-the court up-
held the police actions.
63. Rice v. Wolff, 388 F. Supp. 185 (1974), af'd, Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d
1280 (1975).
64. See, e.g., State v. Glouser, 193 Neb. 190, 226 N.W.2d 328 (1975); State
v. Graves, 193 Neb. 797, 229 N.W.2d 538 (1975).
65. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
66. State v. Dussault, 193 Neb. 122, 225 N.W.2d 558 (1975).
67. Id.
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Holloway is the only Nebraska case in which a warrant was
found to be invalid because the underlying affidavit was insuffi-
cient. That case, however, is unsatisfying as precedent because
there is serious doubt whether all members of the court meant the
decision to act as precedent on the affidavit issue. On the other
hand, until last November there were no cases other than Holloway
where an affidavit was as clearly insufficient as the one in Aguilar,
which is still the federal touchstone.
In the November, 1976, case of State v. Bernth, s the court was
faced with a situation where:
The affidavit stated that the defendant had informed a concededly
reliable informant that he had 'pounds of grass for sale.' The affi-
davit further stated that the informant had identified defendant's
place of residence and that affiant believed the controlled substance
was situated there. 69
The court found that "the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are
such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to
believe the property sought was on the premises described,"7 0 and
that the affidavit was sufficient to justify a warrant to search the
defendant's home even though there were no facts in it to allow the
magistrate to decide whether it was likely that the material sought
was at the residence. The affidavit only stated the police officer's
belief that the drugs were at the home, not the facts underlying that
belief.
The court cited one of its favorite United States Supreme Court
cases, United States v. Ventresca,7 1 with its language about testing
warrants in a common sense and realistic fashion.7 2  "Common-
sense probabilities," the decision concluded, would lead one to
agree with the affiant's belief that the drugs were at Bernth's
home.7 3
68. State v. Bernth, 196 Neb. 813, 246 N.W.2d 600 (1976).
69. Id. at 815, 246 N.W. at 601.
70. Id.
71. 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
72. Affidavits for search warrants must be tested and interpreted
by magistrates and courts in commonsense and realistic fash-
ion, and technical requirements of elaborate specificity once
exacted under common-law pleadings have no proper place in
the area. Where circumstances are detailed in affidavit for
search warrant, and where reason for crediting source of in-
formation is given, and where magistrate has found probable
cause, courts should not invalidate warrant by interpreting
affidavit in hypertechnical rather than in common sense
manner.
196 Neb. at 816-17, 246 N.W.2d at 602 (paraphrasing United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)).
73. Id. at 817, 246 N.W.2d at 602.
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McCown, the author of the Holloway opinion, dissented, as did
Justice Clinton. Both indicated that the affidavit was insufficient
to justify the warrant. McCown based his two-and-a-half-page
dissent on previous case law, including Aguilar and Holloway.
Clinton, apparently unwilling to adopt a McCown search-and-
seizure opinion as his own, dissented briefly and separately: "I
dissent because the affidavit recites none of the underlying circum-
stances from which either the informer or the affiant concluded
that the marijuana was located in the residence of the defendant".74
McCown, in his dissent, accused the majority of going "far
beyond any prior decisions of this court, or of any other court, in
emasculating the Fourth amendment protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures."75
If the majority's opinion was as McCown characterized it, not
only may defective affidavits be cured after a warrant is issued, but
the standards for a sufficient affidavit, as recited in Holloway, are
essentially gone. The majority spoke of a "concededly reliable
informant"76 and McCown noted that it was "conceded in this case
that the informer was reliable."77  Therefore, the court never
74. Id. at 821, 246 N.W.2d at 604.
75. Id. at 819, 246 N.W.2d at 603.
This court how holds that if an affidavit for a search warrant
shows only that a "reliable" informer reported that a named
individual orally stated that he "had pounds of grass for sale,"
that information standing alone is sufficient to establish prob-
able cause for the issuance of a warrant to search the resi-
dence of the individual who reportedly made the statement.
The affidavit here recited a bare conclusion reflecting only
suspicion. It recited none of the underlying circumstances
from which either the informer or the affiant concluded that
the marijuana was located in the residence of the defendant.
There was no information against the defendant before the
magistrate except the quoted statement from the affidavit, nor
was any other information presented at the suppression hear-
mg.
Id. He seems here to concede that additional information could have
been presented at the suppression hearing. However, in his next para-
graph, McCown again reiterated the rule he stated in Holloway: "[I]n
passing on the validity of a search warrant, the court may consider
only information brought to the attention of the magistrate." Id.
There is no information in the affidavit that the defendant
had even been associated with drug or criminal activities, or
had ever possessed, sold or used marijuana. There is no in-
formation or circumstance of any kind to support any such
assumption, except for the fact that the defendant reportedly
made the quoted statement.
196 Neb. at 820, 246 N.W.2d at 604.
76. Id. at 815, 246 N.W.2d at 601.
77. Id. at 819, 246 N.W.2d at 604.
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reached the question of whether it is still necessary to recite facts
that would pursuade the magistrate that the informer was, indeed,
trustworthy. However, the other.part of the Holloway test, wheth-
er the affidavit recited "some of the underlying circumstances from
which the informant concluded that the articles were located where
he claimed they were,"78 was completely swallowed by the "com-
mon sense" rule. In Bernth, it appeared that the informer wasn't
even the authority cited-it was merely the police officer's "belief"
that was offered to the magistrate.
In its eagerness to allow this search, perhaps in its well-mean-
ing belief that drug traffic and other crimes had to be stopped at
any cost, the court lost sight of one fact:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support
of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.79
It seems clear that, dictum or holding, the portion of Holloway
which set a standard for affidavits is no longer controlling in
Nebraska. The substitute is a loosely-defined "common sense"
test, in which the common sense of the magistrate is viewed by a
court whose hindsight is biased by the knowledge that the chal-
lenged search was a fruitful one.
2. The Extent of a Warrant's Authorization
When interpreting the warrants themselves, cases are even
harder to follow. One problem is that, as soon as the extent of a
warrant has been exceeded, the court tends to find other justifica-
tions for the search. The one intriguing exception is the 1976
Aden case, 0 that may signal a break with the law as it had been
stated in the past ten years or may just represent a situation that so
shocked the conscience of the court that it felt compelled to find its
standard exceeded. Before discussing Aden, it will be useful to
look at a few cases that preceded it.
A fairly simple problem was posed by a 1966 case, State v.
McCreary.8s Police officers, believing that McCreary had burglar-
78. State v. Holloway, 187 Neb. at 4-5, 187 N.W.2d at 89, cited in State v.
Bernth, 196 Neb. at 819, 246 N.W.2d at 604.
79. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (quoting Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
80. State v. Aden, 196 Neb. 149, 241 N.W.2d 669 (1976).
81. 179 Neb. 589, 139 N.W.2d 362 (1966).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ized a telephone coin box, got a warrant to search his apartment.
The affidavit stated that the police expected to find burglary tools
and equipment and the coin box. When they arrived at the
apartment, they also found and seized piles of coins, evidence that
was later admitted at McCreary's trial.
McCreary was convicted and appealed to the Nebraska Su-
preme Court, contending, among other things, that evidence of the
money should have been suppressed. If the court agreed that, in
effect, "the constable had blundered," McCreary might have gone
free.82 Instead, it found that the money, because of its condition
and denominations was clearly an "instrumentality of the crime"83
and could be seized even if not included in the warrant. Thus, the
warrant became an admission ticket and, once on the premises, the
police were free to seize anything that appeared relevant.
A few years later, in State v. Harding,4 police had a warrant to
search an apartment. The search of the apartment was fruitless
but a search of a car parked outside produced a cache of mari-
juana. At a suppression hearing, the warrant for the apartment
search was found to be invalid because of an insufficient affidavit
and that evidence was suppressed.85 However, the search of the
car was valid, as a warrantless search, because there was probable
cause for Harding's arrest at the time.
It would seem that any reasoning that could justify searching
the car would also justify searching the apartment. One can only
surmise that the state did not fight that motion because the police
had found nothing useful in the apartment. On the other hand,
there was no attempt to explain why the car was not included in the
warrant at the start. The court only noted that because of the
"inherent mobility" of the car, it would be unrealistic to expect the
police officers to return to the magistrate for a new warrant.
Similar gymnastics were required in State v. Brooks,86 a 1973
case. There, police had a warrant to search Brooks' home. As
they approached the house, armed with the warrant, they saw
through a screen door what appeared to be a drug sale. They
entered the house, made their arrest, and then served and executed
82. This is the basic dilemma presented by exclusionary rule cases and
the problem the United States Supreme Court focuses upon in much
of its Powell and Rice decision. As noted earlier, he may not go free;
he may only receive a new trial.
83. 179 Neb. at 594, 139 N.W.2d at 366.
84. 184 Neb. 159, 165 N.W.2d 723 (1969).
85. It is not explained why there was a motion to suppress if no evidence
was found.
86. 189 Neb. 592, 204 N.W.2d 86 (1973).
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the search warrant. The warrant did not authorize the police to
enter the house without knocking or otherwise giving notice to the
occupants.87 Again, the court ignored the warrant. It found that
the arrest was justified because the police observed the crime being
committed. Therefore, their no-knock entry also was justified. 8
In State v. Aden,s9 the stage was set for another warrant/no-
warrant metamorphosis. There, police had a warrant to search a
farm in rural Lancaster County where they believed a marijuana
party was in progress. Aden was stopped on his way to the farm,
driving a pick-up truck with a camper on the backY0 A dog was
in the camper which was locked. Aden refused to allow a search,
whereupon, the police officers broke into and searched the camper,
finding 12 pounds of marijuana. After the search, they arrested
Aden.
Justice Clinton, writing for the court, found that there was no
probable cause for the search and that the warrant to search the
farm did not cover vehicles believed to be headed for the farm.
Aden's refusal alone did not create the needed probable cause for a
warrantless search:
If a refusal, for whatever reason, to permit a search constitutes
reasonable grounds for search, then it is plain enough that we write
off the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States and the comparable provisions of our own Constitution.91
There was nothing distinctive about the appearance of the
camper or its contents and the nature of the vehicle itself was not
enough to justify the search.92
What was it about the Aden situation that pushed the court
over the line? It appears to have been the forced entry in the face
of an unequivocal refusal of consent that led it to look critically at
the probable cause issue and to construe the warrant narrowly. The
court appeared to be applying the "shock-the-conscience" test of
87. Id. at 593, 204 N.W.2d 87.
88. This issue was disposed of rather quickly in the opinion. The main
issue in the case, which defendant lost on also, was prosecutorial mis-
conduct. The prosecutor commented in his closing argument upon
Brooks' failure to take the stand.
89. 196 Neb. 149, 241 N.W.2d 669 (1976).
90. A study of Nebraska cases would lead one to believe that a truck-
top camper is standard equipment for anyone dealing in illegal drugs.
91. 196 Neb. at 157-58, 241 N.W.2d at 673.
92. In other camper cases, there also appeared to be nothing distinctive
about the nature of the vehicle. However, in those cases, the pick-
ups were stopped for other reasons. See notes 156-66 and accom-
panying text infra.
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Rochin v. California93 which the United States Supreme Court
used in pre-Mapp reviews of state fourth amendment decisions.
It appears that standards for affidavits in Nebraska will be
loosely enforced and defective warrants can be cured by bringing
additional information before the magistrate or judge, even as late
as the suppression hearing or the trial itself. Furthermore, the
limits of a warrant will be viewed flexibly and Nebraska courts
often will find reasons to justify a search that exceeds the limits of
the warrant. Not only does the Nebraska Supreme Court favor the
validity of a warrant,94 but the court has said it will uphold the
validity of a search with an invalid warrant where a warrantless
search would not be permitted.9 5
B. Warrantless Searches
Given such a situation, one would expect searches to be con-
ducted without warrants only in the most exigent of circumstances.
One would also expect the court to take a somewhat strict view of
the validity of those searches9 6 Yet, the vast majority of the
search and seizure cases which have come before the court involved
warrantless searches, often in circumstances where the police offi-
cers could have sought a warrant, and, with one exception, every
one of those searches also was upheld.
The authority to search without a warrant is derived in part
from statute, but the language of the statute has been fleshed out
by the court. The statutory provision 97 speaks of the "constitu-
tional right" of an officer to search without a warrant in some
circumstances. This probably means that the legislature intended
Nebraska police officers to be allowed to make any search allowed
by the Constitution, as interpreted by the courts. The relevant
statutory provision98 seems to create two requirements: (1) that
93. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
94. State v. McCreary, 179 Neb. at 593, 139 N.W.2d at 366 (quoting United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)).
95. For the authority usually cited, see United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 106 (1965).
96. United States Supreme Court cases would seem to mandate the stricter
view. Ventresca, for example, expresses a strong preference for
searches pursuant to a warrant. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
359 (1967), terms warrantless searches "presumptively unreasonable"
(concurring opinion).
97. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-817 (Reissue 1975).
98. Nothing in Sections 29-812 to 29-821 shall be construed as re-
stricting or in any way affecting the constitutional right of any
officer to make reasonable searches and seizures as an incident
to a lawful arrest nor to restrict or in any way affect reason-
able searches and seizures authorized or consented to by the
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the search be reasonable and (2) that it be incident to an arrest or
that there be consent. The Nebraska Supreme Court, on the other
hand, has presumed reasonableness when it found consent, or an
arrest, or probable cause for an arrest. The final, catch-all clause
has included investigation and seizure of items "in plain view,"
emergency searches, "stop and frisk" situations, and the stopping
of vehicles ostensibly for license and registration checks.
Many of the cases include more than one possible justification
for searches and seizures. In State v. Wood,9 9 for example, a
police officer stopped a truck-top camper because the front license
plate was not visible.10 0 A check of the registration led the officer
to suspect that the vehicle was stolen. In his search for "indicia of
ownership," the officer detected an aroma of marijuana and saw
sawdust and "fresh carpenter markings."10 At that point, he
asked for and received permission to search the camper.
As with the warrant cases, a court is in a position where it only
hears cases in which the warrantless search was fruitful. Only
Hollis Compton' 0 2 knows how many truck-top campers stopped in
Ogallala are legally owned and driven and contain no drugs-or
even the whiff of drugs.
Some general rules can be drawn from such cases. First, if the
police officers have probable cause to make an arrest, 0 3 they may
make a search and do not seem to be restricted to the body of the
defendant and the area under the defendant's control. 0 4 If there
is something "in plain view" to arouse the police officer's suspi-
cions, he may make a search. Searches made while a person is
under "temporary detention" are also valid. The concept of "exi-
gent circumstances" has been stretched to cover parked cars as well
as those about to be driven away.
person being searched, or in any other manner or way au-
thorized or permitted to be made under the Constitution of
the United States and the Constitution of the State of Ne-
braska.
Id.
99. 195 Neb. 353, 238 N.W.2d 226 (1976).
If, as Justice McCown contended, Colgrove overruled State v.
Romonto, 190 Neb. 825, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1973), a case with similar
facts, it also overruled this case.
100. Stops of this sort, often made by Trooper Hollis Compton in or near
Ogallala, have produced a subclass of search and seizure cases of their
own. The most recent was State v. Sotelo, 197 Neb. 337, 248 N.W.2d
767 (1977).
101. 195 Neb. at 354, 238 N.W.2d at 228.
102. See note 100 supra.
103. NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 29-404.02 (Reissue 1975).
104. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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1. Searches Incident to Arrest
It is not necessary to actually make an arrest before beginning
the search, 0 5 but reasonable grounds for an arrest should exist.
There is often a bootstrap effect: the search yields the grounds for
the arrest and the arrest provides the justification for the search.
The test has been stated in these terms: "Would the facts available
to the officer at the moment of the search or the seizure warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate?"'106
If there is an arrest, the charge need not result in a valid
conviction. In one case, State v. McFarland,10 7 the defendant was
arrested for shoplifting. He was accompanied from the store to a
car he was using.'08 A search of the car yielded a small cache of
drugs. The shoplifting conviction was later reversed and dis-
missed. However, the drug charges that grew out of the search
resulted in a revocation of McFarland's probation. 0 9
In another bootstrap situation, police arrived at a house after
receiving a tip that there was a drug party in progress. The
defendant refused to let the police into the house but the informer,
who was a guest at the party, opened the door. Inside the house,
the police were greeted by the smell of burning marijuana. There
was some question whether the defendant then consented to a
search but it was made before the arrest and appeared to provide
some of the grounds for the arrest.
The court first looked at the arrest:
An arrest based upon probable cause derived from facts and cir-
cumstances within an officer's knowledge or of which he has
reasonable information sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in believing an offense has been or is being committed may
be made without a warrant.110
Then the court found that the search that preceded the arrest
was also valid: "A search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is
not violative of the Fourth Amendment.""' Nowhere did the
105. State v. Harding, 184 Neb. 159, 165 N.W.2d 723 (1969).
106. Id. at 167, 165 N.W.2d at 728 (quoting State v. Dillwood, 183 Neb. 360,
160 N.W.2d 195 (1968)).
107. 195 Neb. 395, 238 N.W.2d 237 (1976).
108. The car appears to have been borrowed from a friend, possibly without
explicit consent, but not stolen in the usual sense.
109. The rules for a revocation of probation and a criminal conviction, in-
cluding the rules of evidence, are not identical. Therefore McFarland
may not have great precedential value.
110. State v. Heiser, 183 Neb. 665, 668, 163 N.W.2d 582, 585 (1968).
111. Id.
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court ask why the police arrived uninvited at the party with neither
arrest nor search warrant.
Because the case was decided a year before Chimel v. Califor-
nia,112 the more expansive rules of Harris v. United States'13 and
United States v. Rabinowitz' 4 would have controlled, and a thor-
ough search of the house would have been justified as an incident
to the arrest.
This same approach was used in a 1976 misdemeanor case,
State v. Thompson.115 In Thompson, police stood in an alley and
looked through binoculars into the defendant's living room. They
saw someone smoking a cigarette which was held with a pair of
scissors. From time to time the smoker appeared to pass the
cigarette to another person, not visible to the police officers. Con-
cluding that they were witnessing a marijuana party, the police
entered the house and saw the defendant, scissors and handrolled
cigarette in hand, cigarette papers in plain view, and the smell of
burning marijuana permeating the air.
The arrest was justified, the court concluded, because the
police saw a misdemeanor occurring in their presence and the
evidence was rapidly disappearing: "The evidence shows the offi-
cers observed a marijuana party in progress and then arrested the
participants. The officers had a right to be in the alley and there
was nothing unlawful in their use of binoculars."" 06
Justice Clinton, who dissented, would not have permitted the
search. He was not pursuaded that a misdemeanor occurred "in
presence" of the officers nor did he find the necessary probable
cause plus exigent circumstances required for a warrantless entry
into a person's home."7
Judge Grant, a district judge sitting on the court when Thomp-
son was decided, returned to basic principles. He found that
Thompson and his companion had exhibited the very "expectation
of privacy" that the fourth amendment protects and saw no coun-
tervailing justification for the "warrantless government intrusion
into his home." 118
112. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). This case limits the area of search to that within
the defendant's immediate control, that is, the area from which he
could reasonably draw a weapon or reach and destroy evidence.
113. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
114. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
115. 196 Neb. 55, 241 N.W.2d 511 (1976).
116. Id. at 57, 241 N.W.2d at 513.
117. Id. at 58-63, 241 N.W.2d at 513-16.
118. 196 Neb. at 58, 241 N.W.2d at 213. The often-quoted "reasonable
expectation of privacy" formulation is from Justice Harlan's concur-
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It is unclear whether both probable cause and exigent circum-
stances are required. In State v. Pope,119 as in Thompson, the
court found both. In others, such as State v. Jefferson,1 20 only the
probable cause element was discussed. In other cases, only the
exigent circumstances seemed to be relevant.
Similar rules seem to apply to brief detentions as to full arrests.
In State v. Robinson'2 ' for example, police held a car for 27
minutes while they checked to see if the meat in the back seat was
stolen. In State v. Brown, 22 police did not have enough informa-
tion to justify a search warrant but stopped the defendant's pickup
anyway. When talking to Brown, they noticed marijuana on the
seat of the pick-up, arrested Brown, and searched the entire
truck-not just the area within Brown's control. 23  Evidence
found under the seat and in the bed of the pickup was held
admissible as the result of a valid search incident to an arrest. 24
2. Consent Searches
Generally, if one voluntarily consents to a search, he cannot
later complain that the search was invalid. However, problems
arise in such cases also. First, there is the issue of voluntariness.
Second, there is the issue of whose consent is valid. Third, there
are special cases, such as tests for drunkenness, where consent is
implied.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has held repeatedly 25 and une-
quivocally that police need not tell someone that he has the right to
ring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The major-
ity opinion spoke of "what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public." Id. at 351.
119. 192 Neb. 755, 224 N.W.2d 521 (1974).
120. 196 Neb. 340, 242 N.W.2d 881 (1976).
121. 193 Neb. 379, 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975).
122. 195 Neb. 321, 237 N.W.2d 861 (1976).
123. Note that Brown was decided in 1976, while Chimel was decided in
1969.
124. Police found heroin cut with Dorman and rat killer. Brown told them
he was on his way to clean out a rat-infested apartment.
125. The most frequently cited Nebraska case is State v. Forney, 181 Neb.
757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967) (Justice Spencer's opinion on State's appeal
from the sustaining of a motion to suppress evidence), aff'd, 182 Neb.
802, 157 N.W.2d 403 (1968), cert. denied sub nom. Forney v. Nebraska,
393 U.S. 1044 (1969) (Justice White, for the entire court, on Forney's
appeal of his conviction). That case was cited with approval in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231 (1973). The United
States Supreme Court case is generally cited in later Nebraska cases.
In both Forney decisions, an attempt was made to differentiate search
and seizure situations from in-custody interrogations:
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refuse to consent to a search. The case usually cited is Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte,1 2 a 1973 United States Supreme Court case
involving consent given before an arrest. The Court there held
that there was no constitutional requirement of a Miranda-type
2 7
warning but its presence or absence will be a factor weighed in
determining if consent was given voluntarily.
1 28
Consent may be given grudgingly or following threats and still
be valid. In State v. Rathburn, 29 for example, Rathburn refused
to allow police to search the trunk of his car. He had been stopped
for speeding and a police officer "testified that when he ap-
proached appellant's car to inform him that he had been speeding,
he smelled the odor of 'burned marijuana.' ,130 Before asking to
search the car trunk, the officer frisked Rathburn, took several
items from him, and searched the car.
The officer said he would get a warrant to search the trunk and
returned to his patrol car. Rathburn then said: "All right, you
son-of-a-bitch, I will open it,"' 3 ' and did so. The threat to get a
warrant, in the court's view, was not enough to constitute duress or
coercion and, therefore, the consent was voluntary. 132 The test,
the court, said, was whether the statement was coercive in the fact
situation. The court said it was not.
Questions of who may give a valid consent ofter lead courts into
issues of interpersonal relations and the finer points of the law of
real property. Thus, a landlord who rents a field with a barn on it
may consent to a search of the barn;13 3 a father may authorize the
While I concede that protection from unreasonable searches
and seizures is fully as important and imperative as the guar-
antees provided by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States and is basic to a free society, I do not
agree with the trial court's premise. So far as I have been
able to determine, the United States Supreme Court has not
applied the Miranda test to searches and seizures. Until it
does so, if it ever does, we should not further shackle law en-
forcement.
181 Neb. at 760-61, 150 N.W.2d at 917-18. "Asking for consent nega-
tives independent authority for a search. In-custody interrogation,
without the warnings, implies the authority." 182 Neb. at 805, 157
N.W.2d at 405.
126. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
127. Id. at 222.
128. The trial court had sustained a motion to suppress on the grounds that
the consent given by Forney was not voluntary because he did not
know that he had the right to refuse.
129. 195 Neb. 485, 239 N.W.2d 253 (1976).
130. Id. at 487, 239 N.W.2d at 255.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 490, 239 N.W.2d at 256.
133. State v. Shrader, 196 Neb. 632, 244 N.W.2d 498 (1976).
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search of his daughter's apartment; 134 and if someone plans a trip
with his girlfriend, shares a suitcase with her, and they are on the
way to the airport in her car, she may consent to a search of both
car and suitcase.13 5
To the extent that there is a rule, it is that anyone connected
with the property may validly consent to a search of it. 3 0 As the
court has said:
When the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof
of voluntary consent it is not limited to proof that the consent was
given by the defendant, but may show that the permission to search
was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority
over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects
sought to be inspected.' 3 7
In a line of drunk driving cases, where no specific consent was
given to a blood test, the Nebraska Supreme Court consistently
upheld the implied consent statute'3 8 to find that no consent was
needed. The one exception was State v. Howard,39 where blood
was drawn while Howard was unconscious. 40' This offended the
court's sensibilities and it held that blood could not be drawn
without consent unless the person suspected of drunk driving had
been arrested.
In reaching its conclusion, the court asserted that Schmerber v.
California,14 ' the United States Supreme Court case that upheld
the taking of blood for a drunkenness test from a suspect who
refused to consent, should be limited to its facts, which included
the fact that Schmerber was under arrest at the time the blood was
taken. However, one of the cases upon which Schmerber was
based involved a situation almost identical to that of Howard-an
alleged driver unconscious from injuries.142 Thus, Schmerber, on
its face, is not limited to its own facts but applies, at the least, to
the facts of Howard as well.
In any case, this appears to be one area where Nebraska's
standards are more stringent than federal decisions require.
134. State v. McCreary, 179 Neb. 589, 139 N.W.2d 362 (1966).
135. State v. Van Ackeren, 194 Neb. 650, 235 N.W.2d 210 (1975).
136. Compare this with the rules on standing to complain of an illegal
search. See notes 177-98 and accompanying text infra.
137. State v. Van Ackeren, 194 Neb. at 657, 235 N.W.2d at 215.
138. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08(1) to .08(5) (Reissue 1974).
139. 193 Neb. 45, 225 N.W.2d 391 (1975).
140. He was apparently unconscious from injuries suffered in an automo-
bile accident.
141. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
142. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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3. Emergencies and Other Special Cases
Often, police exercise their common law right to make a search
and seizure without a warrant due to an emergency only when
evidence is about to be lost or destroyed. The issue is not whether
such entries may be made, but when a genuine emergency exists.
State v. Patterson,'1 4 3 presented a classic fact pattern. There,
police received a tip from the owner of a building that one of his
tenants was preparing heroin for sale. A search of the trash cans
outside the building revealed large numbers of Dormin 4 4 contain-
ers and some paper bags with traces of heroin. Police leased the
apartment next door to the suspected heroin processing facility and
conducted a surveillance for about 24 hours.
Toward the end of the period, while an officer at police head-
quarters was preparing an affidavit for a search warrant, the police
at the apartment house became persuaded that there was heroin
next door and that the occupants were about to leave before the
warrant could be obtained. So, they went next door, without a
warrant, arrested nine persons and seized more than 1,000 "hits"
of heroin. Two of the nine were convicted, partly on the basis of
the seized evidence.
In its opinion, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that "exigent
circumstances" existed, the search was "limited" and only contra-
band was seized.
1 45
The court held that (1) a search of a residence without a
warrant is justified only when there are both probable cause and
exigent circumstances, (2) where police reasonably believe a felo-
ny to be in progress and that there is a great likelihood that
evidence will be lost or destroyed, probable cause and exigent
circumstances exist, and (3) although it is preferable that police
obtain a warrant, a search is not necessarily unreasonable merely
because police could have obtained a warrant but did not.
1 46
These holdings formed a stringent test, and one that the facts
of Patterson met. However, much the same reasoning was used in
Thompson, 47 the "marijuana party" case. There, at most, a
misdemeanor was in progress148 and, although the evidence might
143. 192 Neb. 308, 220 N.W.2d 235 (1974).
144. The court identified Dormin (also spelled "Dorman" in some cases)
as a non-prescription drug used to cut and dilute heroin. Id. at 310,
220 N.W.2d at 237.
145. Id. at 315-16, 220 N.W.2d at 240.
146. Id. at 316, 220 N.W.2d at 240.
147. State v. Thompson, 196 Neb. 55, 241 N.W.2d 511 (1976).
148. A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the
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have been destroyed if the two participants were given time to
finish smoking their cigarette, one must question how much of an
emergency existed.
Almost any time a car is involved, the court will find "exigent
circumstances" because of the "inherent mobility" of automobiles
and trucks-even impounded, parked or otherwise immobilized
ones. 149 In one case, the court confronted the absurdity of that
contention and noted that a United States Supreme Court case,
Chambers v. Maroney, 50 supported the contention that probable
cause and exigent circumstances do not disappear when a car is in
police custody and the danger of removal or destruction of evi-
dence is gone.' 5 '
Another set of cases deals with situations where a valid entry is
made or a car is stopped for a valid reason that has nothing to do
with suspicion of crime. These include investigating a fire, 52
checking license plates or registration of a vehicle, 53 stopping a
driver for speeding, 5 4 or making an inventory search of an im-
pounded car.155
officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person has
committed:
(2) A misdemeanor, and the officer has reasonable cause to
believe that such person either (a) will not be apprehended
unless immediately arrested; (b) may cause injury to himself
or others or damage to property unless immediately arrested;
(c) may destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of
such misdemeanor; or (d) has committed a misdemeanor in
the presence of the officer.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02 (Reissue 1975).
149. Probable cause for searching a motor vehicle is not treated the same
as probable cause to search a fixed structure. State v. Sotelo, 197 Neb.
340, 248 N.W.2d 767 (1977).
150. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
151. State v. Wood, 195 Neb. at 357, 238 N.W.2d at 229.
152. See State v. Howard, 184 Neb. 274, 167 N.W.2d 80 (1969).
Fires, reports of fires, the existence of incendiary devices, and
fire prevention demand the urgent and emergency response
and vigilance of all firemen and law enforcement officers to
protect the public....
is their duty and right any less when, after entry, their
investigation reveals that there is no fire? We think not.
Chief Claussen properly performed his duties here; and there
was no search and no trespass.
Id. at 278-79, 167 N.W.2d at 84-85.
153. See State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975); State v.
Shepardson, 194 Neb. 673, 235 N.W.2d 218 (1975); State v. Rys, 186
Neb. 341, 183 N.W.2d 253 (1971); State v. Smith, 184 Neb. 363, 167 N.W.
2d 568 (1969).
154. See State v. Rathburn, 195 Neb. 485, 239 N.W.2d 253 (1976).
155. See State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 173 N.W.2d 372 (1970).
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These situations tend to lead to "in plain view" cases, that is,
cases where a police officer legitimately stops a car or truck and, lo
and behold, he notices marijuana seeds on the threshold'56 or
floor,1 57 sees apparently stolen furs in the back seat, 5 8 notices an
open whiskey bottle on the floor,15 9 sees items in the back of a
pick-up truck that look stolen, 60 or smells that pervasive aroma of
burning marijuana."" In addition, police may be called by the
post office to inspect packages "broken in transit."'
62
Some of the stories strain credulity, but the Nebraska Supreme
Court repeats them with a collective straight face.'63 For example,
State v. Rys'6 4 began with an apparent motor vehicle violation and
ended with a charge against a "minor in possession of alcohol."
Police stopped the car because it lacked license plates. The
driver showed them a valid title certificate and license.
The marshal, desiring verification of ownership ordered the [6]
passengers out of the automobile and proceeded to look for a regis-
tration certificate, in-transit plates, or other indicia of ownership.
On opening a front door and shining his flashlight in the automo-
bile, he observed a bottle of whiskey lying in plain sight on the
right-hand side of the floor in the front seat area. No other indicia
of ownership was (sic) found.16 5
The court found the marshal's actions perfectly acceptable:
It is generally held that when a motorist is stopped or arrested for
a violation of the traffic or motor vehicle laws, an exploratory
search of the vehicle for the purpose of obtaining evidence of other
offenses is unwarranted. [citations] On the other hand, a search
of such an automobile made in connection with the violation for
which it is stopped is ordinarily held to be a lawful search although
it results in a discovery of evidence of some other offense.166
156. See State v. Shepardson, 194 Neb. 673, 235 N.W.2d 218 (1975).
157. See State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975).
158. See State v. Dillwood, 183 Neb. 360, 160 N.W.2d 195 (1968).
159. See State v. Rys, 186 Neb. 341, 183 N.W.2d 253 (1971).
160. See State v. Oltjenbruns, 187 Neb. 694, 193 N.W.2d 744 (1972).
161. See, e.g., State v. Rathburn, 195 Neb. 485, 239 N.W. 2d 253 (1976).
162. See State v. Collins, 186 Neb. 50. 180 N.W.2d 687 (1970); State v.
Waits, 185 Neb. 780, 178 N.W.2d 774 (1970).
163. For example, in State v. Holloman, 197 Neb. 139, 248 N.W.2d 15 (1976),
police waiting in the defendant's home while he dressed noticed a
sweater and some shoes which they seized. Although the items were
neither contraband nor the instruments of a crime, and the defendant
was not yet under arrest, the seizure was upheld. The Michigan Su-
preme Court upheld an almost identical search made in the course of
an arrest, in People v. Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N.W.2d 686
(1970), rev'd on other grounds, 387 Mich. 551, 198 N.W.2d 297 (1972).
164. 186 Neb. 341, 183 N.W.2d 253 (1971).
165. Id. at 342, 183 N.W.2d at 254.
166. Id. at 343, 183 N.W.2d at 255.
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The court stated a conventional rule of law, but applied it to a
fact situation that seemed to go beyond the intent of that rule. As
Justices McCown and Boslaugh noted in their dissent, once the
driver offered a title certificate and valid driver's license, the officer
had no further reason to search for "indicia of ownership."
One can easily imagine the scene: a carload of kids, probably
rowdy, possibly disrespectful, cruising around town; a police offi-
cer not much older than they; an angry confrontation that escalates
to the point where the police officer is forced to make an arrest in
order to save face. It must happen a dozen times every weekend-
and is just the sort of thing the exclusionary rule is meant to
prevent.1 6 7
It is difficult to say what police may not do in emergency or
other special situations or just what constitutes such an emergency.
For example, cars may be stopped at random to check licenses and
registration and there is even a statutory provision giving the State
Patrol that power, 168 which would indicate that no probable cause
need be shown in those cases. 169 It also is not necessary to have a
situation where evidence may be lost or destroyed or driven away,
at least in the case of automobile searches.
In State v. Wallen,1'0 for example, police came across an
apparently drunk driver in a stalled automobile. They locked up
167. It is the exclusionary rule, rather than the fourth amendment itself,
that is cited as a check on overzealous police officers. See, e.g., Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): "Ever since its inception, the rule excluding
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recog-
nized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct."
Id. at 12. This view is also discussed at length in the Powell and
Rice opinions, particularly the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Bur-
ger.
Another passage of Terry, however, may be more relevant to situa-
tions such as that in Rys:
Regardless of how effective the rule may be where obtaining
convictions is an important objective of the police, it is power-
less to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights
where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are
willing to forego successful prosecution in the interest of serv-
ing some other goal.
Id. at 14.
168. NEB. RE V. STAT. § 60-435 (Reissue 1974).
169. See Justice McCown's dissents in State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 348,
231 N.W.2d 672, 679 (1975), and State v. Shepardson, 194 Neb. 673,
680, 235 N.W.2d 218, 223 (1975), where he argues that there must be
some founded grounds to draw the attention of an officer to a possible
violation of the law and his assertion that the then recent United
States Supreme Court case, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873 (1975), allows only fixed point or checkpoint stops.
170. 185 Neb. 44, 173 N.W.2d 372 (1970).
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the driver and had a local service station tow away the car, in
which clothing and suitcases were "plainly visible" on the back
seat. The car was placed in a fenced lot at the service station, the
Gas Market. Later, with the driver still incarcerated, a "patrolman
went to the Gas Market and proceeded to inventory the contents of
the automobile for the purpose of protecting the defendant against
loss of the personal property and to protect himself against false
claims of loss upon their return to the defendant." 17 1 As part of
his "inventory," the patrolman unlocked the trunk and glove com-
partment and examined the contents of the suitcases. Inside one
of the suitcases taken from the locked car trunk, he found dice and
"other recognized gambling paraphernalia."
The Nebraska Supreme Court asserted that there was no search
and, for that matter, no reason for a search and, therefore, no
warrant was needed.17 2 It stated that contraband was subject to
seizure on sight as an incident to an otherwise lawful search.
The Wallen reasoning was severely criticized by the Eighth
Circuit:
In Wallen, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined there was no
search. It concluded this based upon the fact that "there was no
reason to search," and "there was not even a basis existing for ob-
taining a search warrant." Therefore, the officer's inventory could
not be a search. This seems a highly anamolous position. Officers
apparently are to be placed in a better position when they have
no reason to search, since then a general exploratory "inventory"
will be upheld; while if required to get a warrant they would have
to describe with particularity the things to be seized. . . . To con-
sider an inventory procedure not to be a "search" does violence to
the concept of the Fourth Amendment as a protection of the privacy
of the citizenry against unwarranted invasion by government
officials.173
The Court of Appeals then quoted from Camara v. Municipal
Court, 74 a 1967 United States Supreme Court case: "it is surely
anamolous to say that the individual and his private property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual
is suspected of criminal behavior."' 75
Nebraska's ignominy was short-lived, however. Before its
Powell and Rice decision, the United States Supreme Court ap-
proved "inventory" searches of impounded cars, so long as the
171. Id. at 46, 173 N.W.2d at 374.
172. Id. at 47, 173 N.W.2d at 374.
173. United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 1973) (citations
omitted).
174. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
175. 487 F.2d at 472 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 530).
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"inventory" was performed "pursuant to standard police proce-
dures."176
In short, the bounds of reasonableness are almost non-existent,
as long as police stop short of breaking and entering in the face of
an unequivocal refusal to consent, or taking blood from an uncon-
scious person without arresting him first. Even if a defendant
could clear those hurdles, he would not be home free, either
figuratively or literally.
C. "The Criminal Is To Go Free Because the Constable Has
Blundered?"
It is not enough to show that the constable did, indeed, blun-
der. A defendant must also show that he is the proper person to
benefit from that blunder-that is, that he has standing to raise the
fourth amendment issue. Further, he must be careful not to waive
whatever rights he might have. The objection to the search
and/or seizure must be made at the proper time. There must
be a showing that state action was involved and that the action was
in a context to which the federal constitution applied. Furthermore,
the defendant must show that he was harmed by the trial court's
refusal to suppress the illegally seized evidence. Even then, the
evidence is not excluded for all purposes.
1. Standing
As a general rule, one person cannot assert the constitutional
rights of another.177 As applied to the fourth amendment, this
rule means that one can object to illegal searches of one's own
property, or illegal searches of other people's property if he is
"legitimately on the premises" 7 8 or is in a place where he has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 179 Alternatively, one can gain
standing by asserting a legitimate property interest in the property
seized'80 or because he is charged with a crime with an element
dependent on possession of the item seized. 81
176. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976). This case in-
volved a car impounded for parking violations. The police found
marijuana in the glove compartment. Justices White, Marshall, Bren-
nan, and Stewart dissented.
177. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). If the exclusion-
ary rule is a means of disciplining police officers rather than a per-
sonal constitutional protection, why not allow one person to complain
of an illegal search of another's premises?
178. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
179. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
180. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
181. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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The cases which cause trouble in Nebraska are those where a
defendant claims that he was legitimately in someone else's home
or somewhere else where he would normally expect privacy from
governmental intrusion.
The Rice case, for example, had a companion in the early
stages, State v. Poindexter'8 2 and, later, Poindexter v. Wolff.' 8
Although Rice appealed to the United States Supreme Court and
was close to winning, Poindexter was out of court from the start
because he had no standing to object to an illegal search of Rice's
apartment.18 4
A less clearcut situation was presented by Holloway, discussed
earlier.8 5 Both Holloway and the weapons the police sought were
at a friend's house at the time of the search. The Nebraska
Supreme Court found that he did not fit the Jones category of one
legitimately on the premises nor did he have the reasonable expec-
tation of freedom from governmental intrusions that would give
him standing under Mancusi v. DeForte,"16 another United States
Supreme Court case. The federal district court agreed, 8 7 noting
also that Holloway had the burden of showing that he had the
necessary standing and, because he gave no testimony at all at his
suppression hearing, he failed to carry that burden. 88
The Eighth Circuit, taking into consideration testimony given at
Holloway's trial as well as that offered at the suppression hearing,
reversed, holding that, under Brown v. United States,8 9 Holloway's
mere presence on the premises gave him standing to raise the
fourth amendment issue. "The Fourth Amendment protects the
old friend who 'drops in,' as well as the guest who receives a
specific invitation," the court said. 9 0
On the other hand, if one does normally live in an apartment,
but was not home when the police came to call, one also may lack
standing. This was a holding in the murder case of State v.
Barajas.19 ' After his arrest, police searched the "address that
182. 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972).
183. 403 F. Supp. 723 (D. Neb. 1975).
184. Justice McCown, who dissented in Rice, on the question of the suffi-
ciency of the affidavit, concurred in Poindexter.
185. See notes 48-60 and accompanying text supra.
186. 392 U.S. 364 (1968), cited in State v. Holloway, 187 Neb. at 7, 187 N.W.
2d at 90.
187. Holloway v. Wolff, 351 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Neb. 1972) (petition for writ
of habeas corpus).
188. Id. at 1037.
189. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
190. Holloway v. Wolff, 482 F.2d 110, 113 (8th Cir. 1973).
191. 195 Neb. 502, 238 N.W.2d 913 (1976). Since the court held that Barajas
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defendant had given when he was booked into custody" 192 and
found the murder weapon. Citing the Brown case upon which the
Eighth Circuit based its Holloway opinion and Jones, as well as a
Nebraska case, State v. Van Ackeren,19 3 the court found that
Barajas had no standing to complain of a search of his own home.
Another case where a person lacked standing because he was
away from home was State v. Poulson. 94 Poulson was building a
house and, while it was under construction, lived in an apartment
about two miles away. In the back yard of the house was a garden
with some 611 marijuana plants growing in "ten neat rows,"
watered by a hose. Police photographed and then removed the
plants. There was no violation of his fourth amendment rights,
the court held: "The Fourth Amendment applies to searches of a
person or his house, papers, or effects. This does not encompass a
field which is approximately 75 feet behind a house which the
defendant had not finished constructing and had not yet moved
into."195 It is not entirely clear from the opinion whether Poulson
lacked standing because the incomplete house was not yet his home
or because the plants were in an open field. 90 In either case, the
court ignored the fact that Poulson was charged with a possessory
offense' 97 and should have had "automatic" standing to protest the
legality of the search and seizure. 9 8
2. Waiver, Timing, and State Action
As a general rule, a waiver of a constitutional right must be
made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly. 99 One's fourth
amendment rights, however, may be waived inadvertently, either as
part of the package of rights automatically waived by a guilty
was beyond the protection of the Constitution, this part of the opinion
appears to be dictum.
192. Id. at 504, 238 N.W.2d at 915.
193. 194 Neb. 650, 235 N.W.2d 210 (1975). In Van Ackeren the challenge
was to evidence seized incidentally to the arrest of another person.
194. 194 Neb. 601, 234 N.W.2d 214 (1975).
195. Id. at 603, 234 N.W.2d at 216.
196. The court asserted that the fourth amendment does not apply to open
fields, citing a moonshine case, Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924). As a general rule, Hester is still good law. However, the
problem is distinguishing an unprotected "open field" from the pro-
tected "curtilage" of someone's home. A backyard garden, even a
large one, is probably on the borderline.
197. He was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to manufac-
ture.
198. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
199. Overmeyer v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972).
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plea20 0 or through failure to make a pre-trial motion to suppress
the evidence.
One such failure occurred in State v. Bartlett,2 0 1 a 1975 case.
Bartlett was charged with possession of heroin with intent to
deliver and with being a habitual criminal. His house and grounds
were searched, with a warrant, but among the items seized was
some money that was not included in the warrant. There was no
pretrial motion to suppress the admission of the money as evidence.
That failure, the court held, also constituted a waiver of the right
to object to trial testimony about the seized money.
According to a case decided a year before Bartlett, failure to
make a motion to suppress or, having made one, failure to have the
motion sustained,20 2 does not automatically preclude a defendant
from raising a search and seizure issue at trial. However, it is
within the trial court's discretion to decide whether or not to
consider or reconsider the question.20 3
The Nebraska Supreme Court also is strict on the requirement
for state action, unless wiretapping is involved, and its decisions
appear to be in line with federal standards.
When, for example, the landlady and the owner of some stolen
goods searched a rented garage, no state action was involved.
Police awareness of the search and possible consultation was not
enough to make the private individuals agents of the police.20 4
Both the federal district court and the Eighth Circuit agreed.20 5
Similarly, the fourth amendment does not apply to an airport
employee who opens a suitcase and shows its content to a police
officer. 20 6
A similar question was raised by cooperation among a Scotts-
bluff, Nebraska, sheriff; El Paso, Texas, police; and Mexican
police in Barajas.20 7 Barajas was arrested on his way from Mexico
back into the United States and charged with a murder in Mexico.
200. The court held in State v. Starr, 186 Neb. 327, 329, 182 N.W.2d 910,
911 (1971), that there need not be a direct waiver of each constitution-
al right so long as the plea of guilty is itself voluntary and intelligent.
201. 194 Neb. 502, 233 N.W.2d 904 (1975).
202. Recall that the overruling of a motion to suppress may not be appealed
until after conviction.
203. See State v. Pope, 192 Neb. 755, 224 N.W.2d 521 (1974).
204. State v. Gundlach, 192 Neb. 692, 695-96, 224 N.W.2d 167, 170 (1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 933 (1975).
205. Gundlach v. Janing, 401 F. Supp. 1089, 1094 (D. Neb. 1975), aff'd, 536
F.2d 754, 755 (8th Cir. 1976).
206. State v. Edwards, 197 Neb. 354, 248 N.W.2d 775 (1977).
207. State v. Barajas, 195 Neb. 502, 238 N.W.2d 913 (1976).
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After his arrest, his apartment in Mexico was searched at thq
request of the Scottsbluff sheriff.208
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights only
protects American citizens living abroad from the acts of American
officials. 20 9 The acts of Mexican authorities, even if they are
acting in concert with American authorities, are not affected,2'-e
unless the cooperation is so great as to constitute a joint venture. 211
Without extensive discussion, the court found that there was no
joint venture.212
The one exception to the state action requirement is in the area
of wiretapping. However, the laws against wiretapping are general
criminal statutes, not constitutional prohibitions on the state. Both
federal and state wiretapping statutes have been interpreted as rules
of evidence as well as criminal statutes. 213
It is also clear that illegally seized evidence is only excluded at
trial and then only as substantive evidence. It may be offered at
pretrial proceedings21 4 and it may be used at trial to impeach a
witness. 215
3. "Harmless Error"
The most difficult hurdle in any criminal appeal is showing
that the errors made at trial were sufficiently harmful to merit
reversal of the conviction. The court's philosophy was summed up
by Justice Clinton in State v. Bartlett: 216
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, or judgment
rendered in any criminal case, on the grounds of misdirection of
208. It is not clear from the case why the Scottsbluff sheriff requested the
arrest or why Barajas was tried in Nebraska for a murder that oc-
curred in Mexico. The Scottsbluff sheriff requested the search through
the El Paso police department.
209. 195 Neb. at 505, 238 N.W.2d at 915.
210. Compare Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956) with Birdsell v. United
States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965).
211. 195 Neb. at 505, 238 N.W.2d at 915 (citing Stonehill v. United States,
405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1968)).
212. Id. at 506, 238 N.W.2d at 916. Apparently there was no federal, col-
lateral appeal in this case.
213. See, e.g., White v. Longo, 190 Neb. 703, 212 N.W.2d 84 (1973), a suit
for alienation of affections in which wiretap evidence was held inad-
missible even though the plaintiff had tapped the telephone in her own
home. In a subsequent suit for damages against a private detective
and investigating corporation, the federal district court dismissed, but
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an award
of damages would be appropriate. See White v. Weiss, 535 F.2d 1067
(8th Cir. 1976).
214. See Delay v. Brainard, 182 Neb. 509, 156 N.W.2d 14 (1968).
215. See State v. Ross, 186 Neb. 280, 183 N.W.2d 229 (1971).
216. 194 Neb. 502, 233 N.W.2d 904 (1975).
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the jury, or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for
error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, if the Supreme
Court, after an examination of the entire case finds that no substan-
tial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.2 17
In a case involving the right to counsel, Clinton's predecessor,
Justice Carter,21 8 after protesting that the fourteenth amendment
had not been interpreted correctly since the Slaughter-House
Cases, 219 objected to the "ritualistic limitations" placed upon police
officers and urged the substitution of civil or criminal sanctions
against those who violate the rights of others.220  Allowing a
criminal conviction to be reversed because of constitutional error,
he said, "is a case of burning the house down to eliminate the in-
vading cockroach: ",
2 21
217. Id. at 512, 233 N.W.2d at 911.
218. Clinton replaced Carter on the bench in March 1971.
219. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). These were the first cases in which the United
States Supreme Court construed the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fif-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The bulk of
the discussion of the fourteenth amendment concentrated upon the
privileges and immunities clause and attempted to separate the "privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States" and those of
citizens of the several states, held that the fourteenth amendment only
applied to the former, and found that the former were little more than
the right to travel to the seat of the government and be protected
while on the high seas. The due process clause, on the other hand,
got very cursory treatment:
We are not without judicial interpretation, therefore, both
State and National, of the meaning of this clause. And it is
sufficient to say that under no construction of that provision
that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can
the restraint imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the exer-
cise of their trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held
to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of that
provision.
Id. at 80-81.
Virtually all the later cases imposing constitutional restraints upon
the states have based their argument upon the due process clause.
"Its [the 14th Amendment's] purpose was to give slaves the same
rights as other free men; not to transfer power from the states to the
federal government." State v. Johns, 185 Neb. 590, 604, 177 N.W.2d
580, 588 (1970) (Carter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
220. Justice Carter went on to acknowledge that the supremacy clause re-
quires the Nebraska court to follow the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court, but he opposed following those opinions any more
than absolutely necessary:
But in the absence of specific holdings applicable to factual
situations before us, I do not subscribe to the expansion of
the ritualistic rules of that court which can only serve to strap
down and mitigate the efforts of law enforcement officers in
the performance of their duties in enforcing the law.
185 Neb. at 605, 177 N.W.2d .at 589,
221. Id,
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In most criminal cases coming before us, including those related
to punishment for crime, the guilt or innocence of the defendant
is not an issue. Such is the case here. The issues which confront
us are largely whether the constitutional rights of the defendant
have been abridged; rights which are such because the Supreme
Court of the United States proclaims them to be such, and which
then roots them into the due process clause of the Constitution to
avoid decisions adverse to their encroachment. . . The public in-
terest is completely ignored in favor of those who willfully violate
the law.222
Such sentiments did not leave the court with Justice Carter.
223
Regardless, the Nebraska Supreme Court has not embraced the
federal rule on constitutional error, despite the United States Su-
preme Court's ruling in Chapman v. California: 224
Whether a conviction for crime should stand when a state has failed
to accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as
much of a federal question as what particular federal constitutional
provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether
they have been denied.225
Chapman found unconstitutional a provision of the California
constitution that was almost identical to Clinton's formulation in
Bartlett. The major difference was that Clinton spoke of a "sub-
stantial miscarriage of justice" and the California provision omitted
the word "substantial." This would seem to make the burden on
the prosecution less than that imposed by the former California
rule, but might have been an attempted bow to the Chapman
court's statement that the "federal rule emphasizes 'substantial
rights'.as do most others. The California constitutional rule em-
phasizes 'a miscarriage of justice.' "226
However, it was not the word "substantial" that was crucial in
the Chapman holding. The court actually held:
[T]hat before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless be-
222. Id. at 605-06, 177 N.W.2d at 589.
223. In recent years the federal courts have tended to go to great
lengths to protect the individual malefactor on constitutional
grounds and have discounted the public need for protection.
As a result the term "obscene" has been to all intents and
purposes emasculated.... Although we may doubt the
logic, and disagree with the permissiveness engendered, we
are nevertheless bound by constitutional restrictions as inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court.
State v. Little Art Corp., 189 Neb. 681, 683-84, 204 N.W.2d 574, 576-
77 (1973). See also State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915
(1967).
224. 386 U.S.18 (1967).
225. Id. at 21.
226. Id. at 23,
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yond a reasonable doubt. While appellate courts do not ordinarily
have the original task of applying such a test, it is a familiar stand-
ard to all courts, and we believe its adoption will provide a more
workable standard, although achieving the same result as that
aimed at in our Fahy case.227
IV. CONCLUSION
One might speculate whether the "full and fair litigation" of a
fourth amendment claim in the state courts requires application of
the Chapman standard and other federal standards. However,
even if it does, would the United States Supreme Court hear the
collateral claims? The Powell and Rice opinion, based as it is
upon the alleged futility of habeas corpus relief as a means of
disciplining wayward police officers, suggests an implicit abandon-
ment of federal "harmless error" standards as well as federal
standards for the legality of the search and/or seizure itself. In-
deed, it seems that Justice Harlan, who dissented in Chapman, may
have had the last word after all. He said:
I regard the Court's assumption of what amounts to a general
supervisory power over the trial of federal constitutional issues in
state courts as a startling constitutional development that is wholly
out of keeping with our federal system and completely unsupported
by the Fourteenth Amendment where the source of such a power
must be found .... =
It appears that the "startling constitutional development" of
Chapman has been reversed and, possibly, so has that of Mapp v.
Ohio.229 It will be interesting to see how much farther from-or
closer to-federal standards the Nebraska court will move in re-
sponse to that reversal.
Jill Beckoff Nagy '77
227. Id. at 24.
228. Id. at 46-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
229. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
